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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, doing business in the
state of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Appellant

Supreme Court Docket No: 45764

vs.
Twin Falls County No. CV42-16-2539
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho
corporation;
JAMES E. SKINNER, an individual; and
DAVID C. SKINNER, an individual;
Defendants/Respondents

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls.
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, Presiding.

Bren E. Mollerup
Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC
126 2nd Ave. North
PO Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83301
mollerup@benoitlaw.com
Attorney for Kenworth Sales Company

Joe Rockstahl
Rockstahl Law Office, Chtd.
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, ID 83301
service@joerockstahl.com
Attorney for Skinner Trucking, Inc
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Please see the Statement of the Case section found in Petitioner’s initial brief.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Analysis/Application of the Elements of a Prima
Facie Unjust Enrichment Case.
Kenworth argues that the District Court, in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
issued on December 19, 2018 by Judge Randy J. Stoker, failed to apply the whole test to
determine if a claim for unjust enrichment had been established. Kenworth claims that the
Court’s failure to properly apply the first prong of the test lead to an improper result.
Even if the application of the law is in dispute here, the applicable law is not. A prima
facie case for unjust enrichment exists where: “(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance
of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof.” Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v.
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). “A person
confers a benefit upon another if he or she gives the other some interest in money, land, or
possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the
other, or in any other way adds to the other's advantage.” Id.
Kenworth states that, “what is missing entirely from the court’s analysis is any
application of the language from Med. Recovery Services regarding one who ‘performs services
beneficial to or at the request of another’ or who ‘in any other way adds to the other’s
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advantage.’” Appellant Brief, p. 5. The Court did not err in its decision that Kenworth did not
satisfy Skinner’s debt under the definition, contrary to what Kenworth asserts.
The Court found that, “Since the vehicles sold for the residual amount there was no debt
owed by defendants to GE TF Trust in regards to the residual value of the vehicles, Kenworth
did not satisfy Skinner’s debt. Without a debt to satisfy there is no benefit conferred upon
Skinner by Kenworth, and its unjust enrichment claim fails.” (Vol. 1. pp. 134). However, the
Court continued on to state, “Kenworth also argues that they paid $7,073.17 to GE TF Trust for
bank rent owed by Skinner. This amount is roughly three times the monthly rent owed for one
vehicle. Testimony at trial established that Skinner was in fact, $7,073.17 behind in lease
payments on one of the trucks…. Thus, the first prong of unjust enrichment is met on the pastdue lease payments.” (Vol. 1. pp. 134).
Based on the Court’s finding here, Kenworth is incorrect in his assertion that the first
prong’s failure is what led the court to find that an unjust enrichment claim was not met. It is true
that there was no debt to satisfy, which does cause the first prong to fail. Skinner agrees with the
Court on this finding of fact. However, because Kenworth is an officious intermeddler, as the
court properly asserted, there is no requirement that the Court do any further unjust enrichment
analysis. The principle of unjust enrichment is applicable only if the person conferring the
benefit is not an “officious intermeddler.” Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350,
354 (Ct. App. 1997). Since Kenworth is an officious intermeddler, any further unjust enrichment
analysis is not needed.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in its Application of the Officious Intermeddler
Defense in Regards to the Timing of the Assertion or the Conferral of the Benefit on
Skinner.
i.

Timing of Assertion
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Kenworth argues that the district court erred when it based its decision in favor of
Skinner on an ‘affirmative defense that was never pled or argued, either before or during trial.’
Appellant Brief, p. 11. Kenworth claims that the district court’s decision is contrary to Idaho case
law and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant Brief, p. 11. This argument is incorrect as
there is no case law nor is there a rule that states the officious intermeddler doctrine must be
raised as an affirmative defense.
Kenworth, in an attempt to mislead the Court, supports his assertion that the officious
intermeddler doctrine is an affirmative defense with case law. None of the cases discussed
actually claim that the officious intermeddler doctrine is an affirmative defense.
First, Kenworth discusses Curtis v. Becker, which discusses the elements of unjust
enrichment and the officious intermeddler doctrine, but does not state that it is solely an
affirmative defense. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 381, 941 P.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App. 1997).
Curtis, a subdivision developer, made improvements to lots in a subdivision, including two lots
whose owners, the Beckers, did not want improvements on. Curtis brought an action for unjust
enrichment against the Beckers, alleging that as a result of the improvements, the Beckers were
unjustly enriched. Id. The Becks defended, stating that the purchase price that they paid included
the costs for improvements. Id. The district court held that the Beckers were unjustly enriched,
and the Beckers appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s holding, stating that the actions that Curtis took on the Beckers’
property were those of an officious intermeddler that were taken for Curtis’s own financial
advantage, leaving any benefit received by the Beckers therefore not unjust. Id. at 385, 357.
The Idaho Court of Appeals made no mention of the timing of asserting the officious
intermeddler defense.
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Secondly, Kenworth cites to Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Mgmt., Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 790
P.2d 372 (Ct. App. 1989). Chinchurreta involved creditors of a health facility that brought a debt
collection suit and sought to attach Medicaid funds owed to the facility. Id. at 592, 373. The
District Court ordered the funds be released to the lessors of the facility, and the Creditor
appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the officious intermeddler rule could not be applied
for the benefit of the creditor. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the case fell outside
of the purpose of the officious intermeddler rule. Id. at 593, 374. The Supreme Court of Idaho
made no mention of the timing of the assertion of the rule.
Kenworth also discusses Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, which discussed a
boundary dispute between two parties who owned adjacent parcels of real property. Teton Peaks
Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 195 P.3d 1207 (2008). Teton Peaks, an investment
corporation, filed suit against the Ohme family to quiet title to the real property in dispute,
alleging trespass, damages, and unjust enrichment. Id. The Ohmes answered with a counterclaim
and an affirmative defense alleging boundary by agreement. Id. The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Ohmes, finding that the encroaching fence between the
properties established a boundary by agreement and that no unjust enrichment had occurred.
Teton Peaks appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. Id at
399, 1212. The Supreme Court found that, “any alleged increase in value to the parcel as a result
of Teton Peaks' rezone falls squarely within the officious intermeddler rule. The Ohmes did not
solicit any benefit and Teton Peaks voluntarily rezoned the property. The district court did not err
by denying Teton Peaks' claim for unjust enrichment.” Id. at 399, 1212. Once again, the court did
not discuss the timing of asserting the officious intermeddler defense.
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While there are not many reported cases within Idaho that discuss the officious
intermeddler doctrine, Kenworth’s attempt to make up law on the issue is inappropriate. No
cases discuss the requirement that the doctrine be pled as an affirmative defense.
In addition, it is important to also mention the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure here as
well. Skinner does not disagree with Kenworth regarding I.R.C.P. 8. Affirmative defenses must
be either asserted or waived in a timely fashion under Idaho law. However, this rule is not
relevant here. The officious intermeddler doctrine is not solely an affirmative defense. I.R.C.P.
8(c)(1) lists the defenses that must be pled affirmatively, and the list does not include the
officious intermeddler doctrine. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 8.
Finally, in order to ensure that the officious intermeddler doctrine applied, Skinner’s
counsel had to confirm at trial with each of Kenworth’s witnesses that there was no agreement
made with Skinner. Once it was confirmed that there was no agreement, then Skinner’s counsel
was able to conclusively find that the officious intermeddler doctrine did apply. Once Kenworth
rested his case, and both parties were preparing for their closing briefs, Skinner’s counsel was able
to apply the doctrine in full. Based on these facts, raising the doctrine earlier in the case would
have been impossible for Skinner.
No further discussion need be had in regards to the timing of the assertion of the defense.
ii.

Conferral of the Benefit

Kenworth also argues that the District Court erred in its application of the officious
intermeddler ‘affirmative defense’. Appellants Brief p. 11. The officious intermeddler rule
essentially provides that a mere volunteer who, without request therefor, confers a benefit upon
another is not entitled to restitution. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho
591, 593, 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Ct.App.1989). This rule exists to protect persons who have had
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unsolicited “benefits” thrust upon them. Id. A person is not an intermeddler if such person has a
valid reason for conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest. Id. Kenworth argues that
such a ‘valid reason’ exists in the present situation. Appellant Brief p. 11.
The District Court, in their decision, addressed this issue as follows:
“Testimony at trial has indicated (and the court has determined in its findings of
fact) that Skinner did not request assistance from Kenworth in paying either the
residual value or the past due lease amounts on the vehicle in question. Thus,
Kenworth volunteered to make the payments. The only question left is whether
Kenworth had a valid reason to do so. Testimony at trial established that the only
reason Kenworth had for purchasing the vehicles from GE is that they wanted to
help keep Skinner in business. There was no testimony indicating that Kenworth
had an interest in the trucks, and while they had a past relationship with Skinner,
there is no indication that Kenworth had an expectation that Skinner would continue
to do business with them. Thus, Kenworth voluntarily purchased the vehicles,
voluntarily paid the past due lease amounts, both without request from Skinner, and
is an officious intermeddler in this case.
(Vol. 1. pp. 134-135). Kenworth states that the Court here recognized their reason for satisfying
Skinner’s debt to GE but still chose to ignore it. Appellant Brief p. 12. This is incorrect. The Court
recognized that Kenworth made a conscious decision to help keep Skinner in business without
being asked to do so. This does not amount to a ‘valid reason’ under the officious intermeddler
definition.
In Curtis v. Becker, the court found that the officious intermeddler doctrine did apply with
regard to the actions taken by Curtis. Curtis v. Becker at 385, 357. There are multiple similarities
between the facts of Curtis and the facts here. Curtis did not obtain the Beckers’ consent before
beginning work on their land, and in our present case, Kenworth did not obtain the Skinner’s
consent before paying for the trucks. In addition, Curtis was acting for his own benefit (he would
be able to comply with the City’s requirements for the subdivision of his own adjacent property
and would therefore be able to realize profits from the sale of his lots), just as Kenworth was acting
for his own benefit (help keep Skinner in business for a potential future relationship). The
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similarities between the cases support the District Court’s decision to find that Kenworth had no
valid reason to confer the benefit. Based on the foregoing, the District Court’s application of the
officious intermeddler doctrine should be approved.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Respondents respectfully request that the District Court’s decision to deny
Kenworth’s unjust enrichment claim and apply the officious intermeddler doctrine be affirmed.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2018.
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD.
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